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Skill-Biased Change in Entrepreneurial Technology
* 
 
In contrast to the very large literature on skill-biased technical change among workers, there 
is hardly any work on the importance of skills for the entrepreneurs who employ those 
workers, and in particular on their evolution over time. This paper proposes a simple theory of 
skill-biased change in entrepreneurial technology that fits with cross-country, historical and 
micro evidence. For this, it introduces two additional features into an otherwise standard 
occupational choice, heterogeneous firm model à la Lucas (1978): technological change 
does not benefit all potential entrepreneurs equally, and there is a positive relationship 
between an individual’s potential payoffs in working and in entrepreneurship. If some firms 
consistently benefit more from technological progress than others, they stay closer to the 
frontier, and the others fall behind. Because wages rise for all workers, low-productivity 
entrepreneurs will then at some point exit and become workers. As a consequence, the 
entrepreneurship rate falls with income per capita, average firm size and firm size dispersion 
increase with income per capita, and “entrepreneurship out of necessity” falls with income per 
capita. The paper also documents, for two of the facts for the first time, that these are exactly 
the relationships prevailing in cross-country data. Quantitatively, the model fits the U.S. 
experience well. Using the parameters from a calibration to the U.S., the model also explains 
cross-country patterns quite well. 
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firm size counts. 1 Introduction
In contrast to the very large literature on skill-biased technical change among workers, there is
hardly any work on the importance of skills for the entrepreneurs who employ those workers, and
in particular on their evolution over time. This paper proposes a simple theory of skill-biased
change in entrepreneurial technology that ts with cross-country, historical and micro evidence.
Technological change is taken for granted as the main historical driver of growth in developed
economies. While dierent types of technological change apart from the neutral variety have
received a lot of attention in the recent literature (see e.g. Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell
(1997) on investment-specic technological change, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante
(2000) on capital-skill complementarity, Katz and Murphy (1992) on skill-biased technical change
and the demand for workers or Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005) on links among the
three), there has been barely any work on how technological change aects entrepreneurs. Yet,
entrepreneurs need to implement the technologies that they and their employees then operate,
so the eect of technical change on entrepreneurs is of crucial importance for how technology
subsequently aects labor demand, wages and employment. This paper aims to ll that gap by
proposing and taking seriously a very simple theory of technology and entrepreneurship.
If changes in technology aect incentives to become an entrepreneur, the evolution of tech-
nology helps shape the rm size distribution. Section 2 presents evidence that this is indeed
the case. It uses historical U.S. data and data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, a
survey conducted in around 50 countries that focusses on obtaining internationally comparable
information on entrepreneurs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper using informa-
tion from that survey for macroeconomic analysis. The section establishes four facts. First, the
entrepreneurship rate falls with per capita income across countries. Second, average rm size
increases with per capita income. The rst fact ts with the nding of Gollin (2007) that the
self-employment rate falls with per capita income in ILO cross-country data. The second one
extends Lucas's (1978) results to more recent U.S. data and into the cross-country dimension.
The next two facts are new: Third, the standard deviation of rm size increases with per capita
income both across countries and in U.S. history. Fourth, the fraction of entrepreneurs claiming
to have chosen their occupation \out of necessity and not to pursue an opportunity" falls with
per capita income across countries. Lucas (1978) and Gollin (2007) provide explanations for the
rst two facts, but their models do not t the other two facts.
The data thus show a relationship between the level of development and features of the
2rm size distribution. The paper shows that this can be explained in an otherwise standard
occupational choice model  a la Lucas (1978) with two additional features: technological change
not benetting all potential entrepreneurs equally, and a positive relationship between an indi-
vidual's potential payos in working and in entrepreneurship.
Anyone who has programmed a VCR or tried to set up a home computing network will
appreciate that while technological progress brings productivity advances, it often goes along
with increased complexity of technology. This is even more so for rms, and not just for large
or \high-tech" ones. Consider the corner shop owner contemplating the installation of bar
code scanners. This allows automating inventory control, but requires managing the related
computing infrastructure. Or consider the owner of a car repair shop who needs to master
the increasing amount of computing power of customers' cars. This allows for faster diagnostic
checks, but also requires mastering technology that is quite distinct from the core technologies
used in that business.
As the menu of available technologies expands, raising aggregate productivity (assuming
love of variety, as in Romer 1987), individual rms have to cope with increasing complexity
of technology. To reect this, the key assumption in the model, which otherwise is a standard
occupational choice model  a la Lucas (1978), is that, while advances in the technological frontier
raise all rms' productivity, they do not aect all rms equally. Some rms absorb more of a given
technology improvement than others, or are more able to use a new technological opportunity.
As a result, some rms remain close to the frontier and use a production process involving many,
highly specialized inputs, while others fall behind the frontier, use a simpler production process,
and fall behind in terms of relative productivity.1
The second crucial assumption is that agents dier in their labor market opportunities
and that more productive workers can also manage more complex technologies if they be-
come entrepreneurs. Occupational choice between employment and entrepreneurship closes the
model. Because advances in the technological frontier do not benet every potential entrepreneur
equally, the position of the frontier then governs occupational choice. The more advanced the
frontier, the greater the benet from being able to stay close to it, as other rms fall behind.
Because in equilibrium, advances in the frontier also raise wages, entrepreneurs' outside option
1Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) document that from 1971 to 2006, the average yearly growth rates of the
stocks of patents and trademarks in the U.S. were 1.9% and 3.9%, respectively, implying a substantial increase
in variety. Similarly, every new classication of occupations in the U.S. from 1970 to 2010 lists more occupations
than the preceding one (Scopp 2003). At the same time, Cummins and Violante (2002) nd that the gap between
the frontier and average technology in use has been increasing in the U.S. over the entire span of their data
(1947-2000), implying that rms have not all benetted equally from technology improvements.
3improves, and marginal entrepreneurs exit. The result is a \history", explored in Section 4, in
which high-productivity entrepreneurs are gradually drawn into the market as their productiv-
ity improves more than others'. Their entry raises labor demand and the wage, implying that
low-productivity entrepreneurs eventually nd employment more attractive and exit.2
The need for skills to deal with a broad array of technologies at the same time is in line
with Lazear's (2004, 2005) nding that entrepreneurs tend to have more general skills than
employees. It also ts with evidence from the burgeoning recent literature on CEOs and CEO
pay, which shows that the importance of general skills has risen of late (see e.g. Murphy and
Zabojnik 2004, Rajan and Wulf 2006, Frydman 2007).3 These skills are usually measured as the
variety of someone's experience of dierent industries, companies, functions within companies
(e.g. production, marketing, nance), and thus technologies. The main reasons for this phe-
nomenon suggested by that literature are a growing need to master more technologies at the
same time and broader responsibilities that come from atter hierarchies made possible by ad-
vancing information technology. If entrepreneurs want to benet from the new possibilities put
on the menu by technological advances, they need to keep up with technological developments.
The degree to which they can do so determines how many benets they reap from technological
progress.4
While the eects of this development on organizational hierarchies and CEO pay have re-
ceived a lot of attention recently,5 the general equilibrium implications have not been studied.
Yet, they are substantial, as incentives for entrepreneurship determine not just individual occu-
pational choice and entrepreneurs' incomes, but also the rm size distribution, aggregate labor
demand, the level of aggregate technology that is actually in place, and output. Analyzing this
2As there is an across-the-board productivity increase in the model as the frontier advances, it also allows for
certain tasks that used to be at the technological frontier to be achieved by entrepreneurs behind the frontier as
technological advances. Think e.g. about multimedia; a professional can now do on a single computer what in
earlier times would have required much more resources. Yet, the frontier moves on { the professional benets,
but entrepreneurs closer to the frontier now can use even more advanced technology.
3Of course, CEOs and entrepreneurs do not fulll exactly the same functions. Still, their job content is rather
similar, with the main dierence being the importance of the willingness to take risk. As this will not play a
prominent role in this paper, CEOs are an informative group of comparison.
4This is qualitatively dierent from the need for employees to keep up with technology: employees need to
apply a given technology, while entrepreneurs need to choose and coordinate the technologies used in a rm's
production process. So even if technological progress had de-skilling elements in the 19th century, as argued by
James and Skinner (1985) and by Cain and Paterson (1986), replacing skilled workers with machinery still made
increasing demands on entrepreneurs to understand and coordinate the new technologies that now were available
in addition to the old ones. The setting here thus does not depend on complementarity between capital and
workers' skills; all that is needed is that keeping up with advancing technology is costly for entrepreneurs.
5Important references include Garicano (2000), Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervi o (2008). For a survey
of the CEO literature see Bertrand (2009).
4is the main contribution of this paper. While the assumptions made here on the use of tech-
nology are admittedly much simpler than those in the micro literature, they make it possible to
transparently obtain a full set of general equilibrium results and compare these to the evidence.
The calibration exercise in Section 5 shows that the model ts the U.S. experience, including
the history of average rm size, well. Although not targeted in the calibration, it also generates
a trend in income concentration at the top very similar to that documented by Piketty and Saez
(2006). More strikingly, using parameter values from the calibration to the U.S., the model
matches not only the qualitative relationship between per capita income and the entrepreneur-
ship rate, average rm size, rm size dispersion and the share of necessity entrepreneurs across
countries, but actually delivers a good quantitative t for some of these dimensions. In par-
ticular, the predicted changes in the entrepreneurship rate and in average rm size with per
capita income are very close to those in the data. Because of its stylized nature, the model
overpredicts the sensitivity of rm size dispersion and the share of necessity entrepreneurs to
per capita income.
Skill-biased change in entrepreneurial technology thus is a convenient way of taking results
from the micro literature on entrepreneurs and skills to macroeconomics. In addition, the
concrete model proposed here ts the U.S. experience well and helps to explain cross-country
dierences in entrepreneurial choice and in the rm size distribution across countries.
Besides the references above, this paper is related to two further strands of literature. First,
several papers have analyzed entrepreneurial choice. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) t a model of
entrepreneurial choice to U.S. data with the aim of assessing the contribution of entrepreneur-
ship and credit constraints to wealth inequality. Their model does not involve changes in en-
trepreneurial choice with development. Entrepreneurial choice and development has been an-
alyzed by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000). These papers
also focus on the role of the wealth distribution when there are credit constraints, but do not
feature an evolving role for skills as the present paper does.
Secondly, some papers have taken a similar view of skills, complexity or the role of the
entrepreneur as this paper. Teulings (1995) relates skills to the ability to deal with complexity,
but does not consider entrepreneurship. Lloyd-Ellis (1999) assumes that skill is required for
implementing a technology, but focusses on the tradeo between using skills for R&D or for
implementation. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) also model a manager's task as nding the
right combination of heterogeneous inputs but focus on the quality of the match between a
rm's products and its workers' skills, not on the evolution of entrepreneurial choice and the
5rm size distribution with development.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the GEM dataset and documents rel-
evant facts about entrepreneurship and the rm size distribution. Section 3 presents the model,
and Section 4 shows how entrepreneurship and characteristics of the rm size distribution change
with development. Finally, Section 5 presents a generalization of the model and quantitative
results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Entrepreneurship, the rm size distribution and development
Obtaining data on the rm size distribution across countries is notoriously hard because measure-
ment is not harmonized across countries. The relatively new Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) dataset is an exception.6 To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper using GEM
data across countries for macroeconomic analysis. As this is a new dataset and probably is not
well known to macroeconomists, I briey present it in the next subsection.
The remainder of the section then shows four facts on occupational choice and the rm
size distribution across countries obtained using the GEM data: entrepreneurship and the self-
employment rate fall with per capita income, average rm size increases with per capita income,
the standard deviation of rm size increases with per capita income, and the fraction of en-
trepreneurs claiming to have chosen their occupation \out of necessity and not to pursue an
opportunity" falls with per capita income. The rst two facts are known yet worth revisiting,
while the last two are new.
2.1 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey
The GEM is an individual-level survey run by London Business School and Babson College now
conducted in more than 50 countries. Country coverage has been expanding since its inception
in 1999, with data for several years available for most countries. The micro data is in the public
domain, downloadable at http://www.gemconsortium.org/. Most developed economies are
represented, plus a substantial number of transition and developing economies, ensuring that
the data covers a wide variety of income levels.7
6Another exception are some OECD publications such as Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) that
provide information on some OECD countries and a limited number of other countries. Their numbers arise from
an eort to harmonize national ocial data, while the GEM approach already involves harmonized data collection
(though inevitably at a smaller scale).
7Inclusion in the survey depends on an organization within a country expressing interesting and nancing data
collection.
6The survey focusses on entrepreneurship. That is, while the survey overall is conducted by
local research organizations or market research rms to be representative of a country's popu-
lation, it contains only limited demographic information (e.g. education) on non-entrepreneurs.
It contains much richer information on entrepreneurs, including on rms in the start-up phase
(a particular focus of the survey). In particular, entrepreneurs report their rm's employment.
Importantly, the survey is designed to obtain harmonized data across countries. It is thus
built to allow cross-country comparisons, the purpose for which it is used here. In addition,
because it is an individual-level survey, it captures all types of rms and not just rms in the
formal sector or above some size threshold. For studying occupational choice, this is evidently
important. This feature makes the GEM data more adequate for the purposes of the analysis
in this paper than rm- or establishment-level surveys such as the World Bank Group En-
trepreneurship Survey, which covers only registered corporations, or Dun & Bradstreet data,
which is reasonably representative of U.S. rms but does not cover many small rms in other
countries, especially in poorer ones.
To obtain data on entrepreneurship rates and necessity entrepreneurship, I use country
averages of the country-level data covering the years 2002-2008 available on the GEM website
for 66 countries. Micro data is available for 1999 to 2005 and covers fewer countries. I use it to
obtain statistics on the rm size distribution, for which no country-level numbers are reported.
As the initial years of the survey may be less reliable, I use the micro data for the period 2001-
2005. For this period, data is available for 47 countries, though not for all years for all countries.
Pooling the available years for each country, the number of observations per country is between
2,000 in some developing economies and almost 80,000 in the UK, with a cross-country average
of 11,700. This is sucient for computing the summary statistics of the rm size distribution
that I use in the following. Unfortunately, in many countries, there are not enough observations
for obtaining reliable estimates for detailed size classes, so I rely on summary statistics for the
entire distribution. I consider someone an entrepreneur if they declare running a rm that they
own and they have already paid wages (possibly to themselves, for the self-employed). I then
obtain rm size data for these rms, truncating the distribution at 1000 employees to reduce
measurement error.
The GEM dataset is very useful because of the harmonized data collection. Moreover, it
allows establishing all facts of interest using one single dataset. However, it is still important to
know that results hold more generally, and are not due to specicities of the survey. Therefore, I
compare the facts presented here to some results from other sources. In addition, Reynolds et al.
7(2005), Acs, Desai and Klapper (2008) and Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) show that observations
from GEM data tend to align well with those based on other sources.
2.2 The facts
Figure 1 plots statistics on entrepreneurship and the rm size distribution against 2005 real
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity from the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston
1991, Heston, Summers and Aten 2009).8 Each subgure illustrates one of the following four
facts:9
Fact 1 The entrepreneurship rate falls with income per capita (see Figure 1(a)).
This ts with the nding of Gollin (2007) that the self-employment rate falls with income
per capita in ILO data. Although the negative relationship between the entrepreneurship rate
and per capita income is very robust, it does not seem to be well known. A possible reason
for that is that the population of entrepreneurs under consideration matters. The fact holds
for broad measures of entrepreneurship that include small rms and, in particular, the self-
employed. When considering only incorporated rms, the relationship is reversed. This is the
case for instance in data from the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey, which covers only
registered corporations. This positive relationship is often attributed to dierences in regulation;
see e.g. Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) and Barseghyan (2008). For studying occupational
choice, focussing on registered rms is not sucient and it is necessary to take into account all
rms, as in the GEM or ILO data.10
Fact 2 Average rm employment increases with income per capita (see Figure 1(b)).
This fact is of course closely related to fact 1, as high entrepreneurship rates must necessarily
imply smaller average employment.11 Previously, this relationship has only been documented
across a limited number of countries (Tybout 2000). In addition, Lucas (1978) reported that
8By its sampling procedure, the survey captures few agricultural businesses (only 4% on average). As self-
employment is typically higher and income per capita typically lower in agriculture (see e.g. Caselli 2005, Restuccia,
Yang and Zhu 2008), the facts presented in the following would be even more pronounced if they could be produced
using a reliable up-to-date measure of non-agricultural GDP per capita at PPP.
9All regression lines plotted in the gure are signicant at least at the 5% level.
10In U.S. history, the self-employment rate fell continuously until the mid-1970s, when it temporarily rebounded
for a few years, mainly due to changes in tax rates (Blau 1987; see also Hipple 2004).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) The share of necessity entrepreneurs
Figure 1: Entrepreneurship, the rm size distribution and per capita income.
Notes: Real GPD per capita for 2005 at purchasing power parity from the Penn World Tables (Summers and
Heston 1991, Heston et al. 2009); entrepreneurship rate, average employment, standard deviation of employment
and share of necessity entrepreneurs from GEM data, http://www.gemconsortium.org. Entrepreneurs are dened
as survey respondents who declare running a rm that they own and who have already paid wages, possibly to
themselves. Necessity entrepreneurs choose the second answer when asked \Are you involved in this start-up/rm
to take advantage of a business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work?" Average rm size
for Latvia is 60% above the next-highest value. This may indicate data problems; the observation is therefore
excluded. All regression lines plotted in the gure are signicant at least at the 5% level.
average rm size increased with per capita income over U.S. history (1900-70). Figure 2(a)
shows that this time-series relationship persists. It reports measures of average rm size close
to those used by Lucas (the two series labelled \BEA Survey of Current Business" and \Dun
& Bradstreet", both from Carter, Gartner, Haines, Olmstead, Sutch and Wright 2006) and
more recent data. All of these series show an increasing trend, except for the period 1900-1930.
9This trend of course occurs simultaneously with increasing per capita income. Firm size thus





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Standard deviation of rm size, 1988-2006
Figure 2: Average rm size (employment) and the standard deviation of rm size over U.S.
history
Sources: Panel (a): Census Enterprise Statistics series: from various Census reports; Census Statistics of U.S.
Businesses (SUSB) series: data available at http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/; BEA Survey of Current Busi-
ness series: from Carter et al. (2006, Series Ch265); Dun & Bradstreet series: from Carter et al. (2006, Series
Ch408). The rst two sources also report total employment. For the last two series, employment is from Carter
et al. (2006, Series Ba471-473 and Ba477). The Dun & Bradstreet rm counts exclude nance, railroads and
amusements. Adjusting employment for this using Series Ba662, Dh31, Dh35, Dh53 and Df 1002 shortens the
series without aecting the trend. Starting 1984, Dun & Bradstreet gradually cover additional sectors, at the
cost of comparability over time, so I only use data up to 1983. Series Ch1 in Carter et al. (2006), which draws on
Internal Revenue Service data, also contains rm counts but is less useful because of frequent changes of denition,
in particular for proprietorships. Panel (b): Computed from Census SUSB data using reported size bin averages.
Fact 3 The dispersion of rm size in terms of employment increases with income per capita
(see Figure 1(c)).
This is the fact for which the GEM data contribute most, as it seems impossible to obtain
from other sources in a consistent way for more than a small number of countries. The gure
shows a clear positive relationship between the standard deviation of rm size and per capita
12Jovanovic and Rousseau (2008) show that another measure of size, patents or trademarks per rm, has also
increased from 1971 to 2006. For other countries, it is not easy to come by histories of average rm size. However,
data reported in a special issue of Small Business Economics reveal that average rm size also increased with
development in several East Asian economies. This is the case in Indonesia (Berry, Rodriguez and Sandee 2002),
Japan (Urata and Kawai 2002), South Korea (Nugent and Yhee 2002) and Thailand (Wiboonchutikula 2002).
Only in Taiwan, the smallest of these countries, did it fall (Aw 2002).
10income. The only previous mention of such a relationship I could nd is Bartelsman et al. (2004),
who show that rm size dispersion is substantially higher in industrialized countries compared
to emerging markets, using OECD and World Bank data for a much smaller set of countries.
Interestingly, the relationship also holds in recent U.S. history. SBA data include the number
of rms in dierent size classes since the 1980s and thereby allow computing an approximate
measure of the standard deviation of rm size. This is plotted in Figure 2(b) and also exhibits a
clear upward trend over time. Unfortunately, I am not aware of data that would allow extending
this series further into the past.13
Finally, it is interesting to consider information the GEM data provides on entrepreneurs'
motivations. The survey identies \opportunity" and \necessity" entrepreneurs. This classi-
cation is based on the answer to the question: \Are you involved in this start-up/rm to take
advantage of a business opportunity or because you have no better choices for work?" While
strictly speaking this question is ill-dened { after all, choosing entrepreneurship implies that
it must have been the best choice { it arguably still conveys information on how strongly the
respondent identies with the term \opportunity". Indeed, upon closer inspection, the answer
to the question turns out to be signicantly related to a rm's current size and growth expec-
tations: necessity entrepreneurs have less education, run smaller rms and expect much less
growth (see Ardagna and Lusardi 2008, Poschke 2010a). These patterns are consistent across
countries. It can thus be taken to be informative about a rm's current state, and also reveals
that founders can, to some degree, anticipate how successful their venture will be. This leads
us to the nal fact:
Fact 4 The share of \necessity entrepreneurs" falls with income per capita (see Figure 1(d)).
While there are necessity entrepreneurs in all economies, including in rich ones, their pro-
portion among entrepreneurs is much higher the poorer the country. In countries with low
per capita income there are thus more entrepreneurs, but a larger fraction of them chooses
entrepreneurship \out of necessity". The share of \opportunity" entrepreneurs is thus smaller.
13Hsieh and Klenow (2009) compute TFP dispersion in China, India and the U.S.. Apart from the fact that
their numbers are hard to compare to the ones obtained here because they are restricted to manufacturing and
refer to establishments, not rms, they are also eectively forced to impose a size cuto because some variables are
missing for small establishments in their otherwise very rich data. This aects measured dispersion. Comparing
their Table I to Census SUSB data shows that in the case of the U.S. in 2001 for instance, they need to exclude
almost half the manufacturing establishments. The size distribution plotted in their Figure IX shows that these
are mostly small establishments belonging to rms with less than 10 employees. While these issues are less
important for the purpose of their paper, it is preferable to have rm data without a size cuto and without the
limitation to a single sector for analyzing occupational choice between wage work and entrepreneurship.
11Lucas (1978) in his seminal occupational choice framework explains Fact 2 by allowing for com-
plementarity in production between the capital and labor inputs. More productive economies
accumulate more capital, which with the complementarity raises wages more than prots, re-
ducing the share of entrepreneurs and thus raising the average size of rms. Gollin (2007)
explicitly introduces self-employment as an option and then uses a similar framework to t
self-employment rates across countries (Fact 1).
In each of these cases, the agents who choose entrepreneurship are the fraction of the popu-
lation that is best at it. Increases in productivity raise the threshold and reduce that fraction.
While this implies that in richer countries, there are fewer and larger rms, this mechanism does
not explain Facts 3 and 4. To the contrary, a more homogeneous population of entrepreneurs
may well reduce the standard deviation of rm size, and the fact that it is always the more able
individuals who choose entrepreneurship does not allow dealing satisfactorily with entrepreneur-
ship out of necessity. The model developed in the next section addresses these points and thus
is able to explain all four facts.
3 A simple model
The economy consists of a unit continuum of agents and an endogenous measure of rms. Agents
dier in their endowment of eective units of labor a 2 [0; a] that they can rent to rms in a
competitive labor market. Refer to this endowment as \ability". Dierences in ability can
be thought of as skill dierences. They are observable, and the distribution of ability in the
population can be described by a pdf (a).
Agents value consumption c of a homogeneous good, which is also used as the num eraire.
They choose between work and entrepreneurship to maximize consumption.14 The outcome of
this choice endogenously determines the measures of workers and of rms in the economy.
Consumption maximization implies that individuals who choose to be workers supply their
entire labor endowment. Denoting the wage rate per eective unit of labor by w, a worker's
labor income then is wa.
Skills and technology. Entrepreneurs run rms and collect their rm's prots. Let rm
i's \technology" be Mi, and assume that it is dened such that rms with a higher level of
14Concave utility would not aect qualitative results. While in general, risk aversion is an important factor
aecting entrepreneurial entry (see e.g. Kihlstrom and Laont 1979, Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn 2009), the
mechanism at the heart of this paper does not interact with it. An extension in Section 5 can be interpreted in
terms of heterogeneity in risk aversion.
12technology, relative to their competitors, are more protable. Also assume that more able
individuals can use better technologies: Mi = M(a;), with @M(a;)=@a > 0.15 For concreteness,
suppose that M =  Ma, where  M  1 is a parameter capturing the state of aggregate technology
and a is the entrepreneur's ability. Then, the most able entrepreneurs (a =  a) operate at the
technological frontier, the least able ones (a = 0) at the lowest level, and intermediate ones at
some distance to the frontier. Under these assumptions, the position of a rm relative to the
frontier, m(a;  M) = M(a;  M)=M( a;  M) =  Ma  a, is bounded between 0 and 1. Crucially, for
low levels of the frontier, all rms are close to it (and if  M = 1, all rms are at the frontier).
The higher the frontier, the more dispersed the levels of technology of potential rms. (Those
of actually active rms will depend on occupational choice.)
This specication captures the eect of increasing technological complexity on individual
rms: as the frontier advances, some rms can stay close to the frontier and use these better
technologies. Other rms can only use some of them, so while they benet somewhat and use
some of the new technologies, their distance to the frontier increases: they benet in absolute
terms, but lose in relative ones. Since more skilled entrepreneurs are the ones who benet most
from technological improvements, this is \skill-biased change in entrepreneurial technology".
In this economy, a population ability distribution will induce occupational choice between
working and entrepreneurship, and correspondingly an ability distribution of workers and a
productivity distribution of rms.
Firm prots. Firms employ labor in dierentiated activities to produce the homogeneous
consumption good. A rm's level of technology Mi indicates the number of dierentiated activ-
ities in a rm and thus corresponds to the complexity of its production process, or the extent of
division of labor in the rm. The assumption that more able individuals can run rms with bet-
ter technology thus concretely means that they can manage more complex production processes,
while others are limited to simple ones.16
15Rosen (1982) also assumes positive correlation of potential prots and wages. Jovanovic (1994) shows that with
a dierent sign of the derivative, radically dierent occupational choice outcomes are possible. Yet, occupational
choice outcomes are quite rich even with the natural assumption in the text.
16This appears to be a very natural way of introducing heterogeneity. Gal  (1995) uses a similar setup, but allows
a representative rms to optimally choose its degree of specialization in production. If stronger specialization is
costless, the greatest degree is optimal. This may not be true if it entails costly complexity. Heterogeneity in the
cost of complexity would induce dierent choices of M. Assuming that the cost of managing complexity decreases
in a then would induce a qualitatively similar relation between M and a as the more direct assumption made in
the text.
13A rm's production technology is summarized by the production function
yi = X
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 2 (0;1); > 1; (1)
where yi is output of rm i, Xi is an aggregate of the dierentiated labor inputs nij it uses,
and Mi indicates the degree of complexity of its technology. The production function exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. This can be interpreted to reect any entrepreneur's limited span
of control, as in Lucas (1978). It also ensures that rm size is determinate, implying a rm
size distribution given any distribution of M over rms. The elasticity of substitution among
inputs is given by . Given that M diers across rms and that thus not all rms use all types
of dierentiated inputs, it is natural to assume that dierent inputs are substitutes ( > 1).
Heterogeneity in M plays a role as long as they are imperfect substitutes, as shown below.17
Importantly, the production function exhibits love of variety, and rms with larger M are more
productive. (Therefore, in the following I will sometimes refer to M as \productivity".) An
increase in the frontier  M then increases all rms' productivity, but benets those close to the
frontier the most.
The rm's prot maximization problem can be solved using a typical two-stage approach:
choose inputs nij to minimize the cost of attaining a given level of the input aggregate X, and
then choose X to maximize prot. The solution to the latter will depend on a rm's productivity
M.
Denoting desired output by  y and dening  X =  y1=, the solution to the cost minimization






 X 8j; (2)
where  is the marginal cost of another unit of X. With constant returns to scale for transforming
the dierentiated labor inputs into X,  is independent of X and equals M
1
1 w, and the demand
for each nj becomes
nj(M) = M
 
 1  X 8j: (3)
17The formulation in equation (1) is isomorphic to one where nal goods rms use (a heterogeneous number of)
dierentiated intermediate products, intermediates are produced using a production function that is linear in labor,
and there is perfect competition in each intermediate goods sector. Monopolistic competition in intermediate
goods can also be accommodated easily and would just require a remapping of parameters. In the quantitative
exercise in Section 5, a more general specication is chosen in which intermediates are produced using capital and
labor with constant returns to scale.
14Because of greater specialization in rms using more complex technologies, their marginal cost
of X, , is lower. As a consequence, they require less of each input to produce  y. Because a
larger M allows a rm to produce more output from a given quantity of inputs, I will in the
following refer to M as the rm's productivity. While M does not equal TFP, it maps one-to-one
with TFP.











1 ; (M) = (1   )y(M): (4)
Both output and prots increase in M. They are convex in M if  >  1
 .18 As this inequality
holds for reasonable sets of parameter values (e.g.  = 0:9 and  < 10), I will from now on
assume that it is satised.
Occupational choice. Occupational choice endogenously determines the distributions of work-
ers' ability and of rms' technologies. Since both the rm's and the worker's problem are static,
individuals choose to become a worker if wa > (M(a)). Given the wage rate, the known value
of an agent's ability thus is sucient for the choice.19
Because prots are continuous, increasing and convex in a, while wages are linear in a, it
is clear that there is a threshold aH above which it is optimal to become an entrepreneur. If
aH <  a (the upper bound on a), high-productivity rms are active in the economy. At the same
time, from (4), (M(0)) > 0 = w  0, so that agents with ability between 0 and a threshold
aL become entrepreneurs. In analogy with the evidence reported in Section 2, refer to them as
\entrepreneurs out of necessity". Individuals with a 2 (aL;aH) choose to become workers.
The existence of necessity entrepreneurs is due to the specic way in which technology and
its relationship with ability is modelled here and need not arise with other ways of modelling
heterogeneity in productivity and its relation to ability. Yet, while the specication chosen here
delivers their existence somewhat directly, their occupational choice arises naturally in more
general settings with heterogeneity in productivity and pre-entry uncertainty about a project's
merits, as shown in Poschke (2010b). More precisely, even if expected prots of the lowest-ability
potential entrepreneur are zero or negative, this is not what matters because of the ability
18A low  implies more quickly decreasing returns to scale. As a result, optimal size responds less to productivity,
and benets from being more productive are not as large, implying less convex (M). High  implies that inputs
are more substitutable, so the benet of being able to use more of them declines.
19We abstract from entry costs, sunk investment, search or other issues that would make the problem dynamic
without necessarily substantially aecting results. For a related setting with search, see Poschke (2010b).
15to reject bad projects. Once only suciently good projects are accepted, low-ability agents
will choose entrepreneurship if projects that are preferred to employment exist and they are
suciently likely to nd them. That paper also provides empirical evidence on the phenomenon
of low-ability entrepreneurship and its relationship with potential wages that ts with the setting
adopted here.
For aH <  a, the resulting occupational choice pattern then is as depicted in Figure 3, which
plots the value of entrepreneurship (solid line) and of employment (line with crosses) against
a. Low- and high-a agents become entrepreneurs, with intermediate-a individuals choosing to
become workers.20 This pattern persists when also considering additional heterogeneity that
is orthogonal to that in a, e.g. dierences in taste for entrepreneurship or in attitudes towards
risk. This two-sided occupational choice pattern ts with evidence on the propensity to be
an entrepreneur across the education and wage distribution reported in Poschke (2010b). It
diers from the pattern usually obtained in this type of model, e.g. the individuals with the
highest entrepreneurial ability (Lucas 1978) or the lowest risk aversion (Kihlstrom and Laont
1979) choosing entrepreneurship. The self-employed in Gollin (2007) also have relatively high
entrepreneurial ability and potential wages.






20The lower threshold aL is always interior (2 (0; a)), as otherwise the labor market does not clear.
16Equilibrium. An equilibrium of this economy consists in a wage rate w and an allocation of
agents to activities such that, taking w as given, agents choose optimally between work and
entrepreneurship, rms demand labor optimally, and the labor market clears.
Denoting the density of rms over a by (a), their total measure by B and total eective
labor supply by N 
R aH














The model is easy to extend to capital as an input, to the production of intermediate goods
outside the rm, with perfect or monopolistic competition, and to other dimensions of hetero-
geneity, e.g. in tastes or in risk aversion. The quantitative exercise in Section 5 will employ such
a more general model.
4 Development and the rm size distribution
In this model, technological improvements aect occupational choice and, through this channel,
the rm size distribution.
4.1 The technological frontier and occupational choice
Changes in the technological frontier aect incentives to become a worker or an entrepreneur
both through their eect on potential prots and on wages. As technology advances, some rms
stay close to the advancing frontier, while others fall behind. As a result, prots as a function
of ability change, the populations of rms and workers change, and the equilibrium wage rate
changes. Using M(a;  M) =  Ma, recall that prots and the wage are given by















where   1
 1

1  > 1. To see the eect of advances in the technological frontier, consider their
elasticities with respect to  M.
"(();  M) = a  
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"(w;  M) (8)









17An advance in the frontier has two eects on prots: it improves every rm's technology
(the rst term), but it also raises the wage rate (the second term), which is a drag on prots.
As the eect of higher wages is independent of a, it is clear that only rms with high enough
a benet from aggregate technology improvements. Low-a rms lose more to the wage increase
than they gain from the productivity improvement. Wages, in contrast, unambiguously increase
with advances in the technological frontier. As a consequence, the composition of the rm size
distribution changes as technology advances.
Note that if all agents had the same ability a, both "(w;  M) and "((a);  M) would reduce to
a
 1. As a consequence, wages and prots would increase in sync with technological advances,
and occupational choice would remain unaected, i.e. the thresholds aL and aH constant. Only
with heterogeneity in a do some agents benet more than others from advances in the frontier,
and occupational choices change.
For an individual with ability a, an improvement in the frontier makes becoming an en-
trepreneur relatively more attractive if







Advances in the frontier thus aect the occupational choices of agents of dierent ability dif-
ferently. For the most productive entrepreneurs (a =  a), "() will always be positive. This is
because for a 2 (0; a] and for any (a), both integrals in (10) are strictly positive. In addition,
a  Ma=  Ma <  a for a 2 [0; a), implying that the ratio of integrals is between 0 and  a. Similarly,
" is strictly negative for the worst entrepreneurs. This implies that as the technological frontier
advances, the best entrepreneurs gain, and the worst ones lose.
Intuitively, whether a rm gains or loses depends on its productivity relative to a complicated
moment of the productivity distribution. This is because advances in the frontier increase labor
demand and wages, and thereby all rms' costs. They also improve rms' productivity { but
only rms that can make use of most of the advance in the frontier benet suciently from this.
Low-a rms that benet only slightly from advances in the frontier are exposed to the wage
increase, while their own productivity improves only mildly.















(a)  Mada]2 < 0: (11)
This implies that even rms that at low levels of  M benet from increases in the frontier see
these benets reduced and eventually turn negative as the frontier advances further. Only
18for rms with a = 1 is it certain that " cannot turn negative. For rms with a = 0, in
contrast, it is always negative. For high enough a, " is positive for low  M, eventually turns
negative and ultimately pushes (a;  M) below wa. The next section explores the evolution of
occupational choice as captured by aL and aH and its implications for the rm size distribution
and entrepreneurship.
4.2 A \history" of entrepreneurship and the rm size distribution
Historically, every successful development experience has been characterized by improvements
in total factor productivity. This section explores the predictions of the model for occupational
choice and the rm size distribution along a \history" of an advancing technological frontier.
As the model is static, every  M induces an equilibrium occupational choice, summarized by
the thresholds aL and aH, and a rm productivity distribution implied by these choices. Let
 M = f  M0;  M1;:::;  MTg,  M0 = 1, be a strictly increasing sequence of real numbers and refer to
it as the history of  M. Analyzing the equilibrium of the model economy for each element of  M
then yields a \history" of occupational choice and the rm size distribution.21
The sequence  M can also be interpreted as a list of dierent countries' technological states at
a point in time. It then induces a cross-section of occupational choices and rm size distributions.
This interpretation is pursued in the next section. To evaluate the quantitative t, the model is
slightly extended and calibrated in that section. This is not necessary for the qualitative history
explored in the present section.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of occupational choice as  M increases. The left panel shows
prots and wages as functions of ability for two levels of  M. As in Figure 3, the straight lines
correspond to wages and the curved ones to prots, and aLi and aHi (i = 1;2) indicate the
choice thresholds.
The left panel illustrates how occupational choice changes with  M. Higher  M raises the
productivity of all rms and thereby leads to higher wages: the wage line pivots up from the
straight dash-dot line to the straight dotted line. Higher productivity raises prots (they change
from the dashed to the solid line), except for some rms of low-a entrepreneurs for who the pro-
21An alternative is to consider a history where  Mt grows over time at an exogenous rate g. This is particularly
relevant in the context of the extension with capital used in the next section. While growth in  M leads to changes
in occupational choice and in the share of entrepreneurs, the setting is consistent with balanced growth since
increases in  M constitute labor-augmenting technical progress and the aggregate production function exhibits
constant returns to scale (King, Plosser and Rebelo 1988). Results in this section can thus also be interpreted as
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(b) The evolution of the thresholds aL and aH with in-
creasing  M
Figure 4: Occupational choice as  M increases
ductivity increase is so small that it is outweighed by the increase in wages. This unambiguously
makes entrepreneurship more attractive for the highest-ability agents, and less so for the ones
with the lowest ability. In the situation drawn in the gure, entrepreneurs with a just below
aH1 still benet and agents at or just below aL1 lose from higher  M. As a result, aH falls from
aH1 to aH2, and aL falls from aL1 to aL2. It is mainly higher labor demand from top rms and
the entry of new relatively productive rms between aH1 and aH2 that drives wages up.
The right panel shows the values taken by aL and aH for a \history" of increasing  M. Starting
from low  M, increases in  M reduce both aH and aL, as in the left panel of the gure. Once
most low-productivity rms are gone, rms with a = aH, while run by relatively high-ability
individuals, actually have low productivity compared to other rms in the economy. From this
point on, further advances in  M raise prots less than wages for rms with a = aH, and the
upper threshold aH shifts up again. (Formally, this is because "(aH;  M) as dened in equation
(10) turns negative with increasing  M, as shown in equation (11).) As  M increases further, aL
falls further, but approaches zero only asymptotically. The upper threshold aH also continues
to rise, albeit at a slow pace. (@"(a;  M)=@  M, while always negative for a <  a, falls in absolute
value as  M increases.) As a result, for very high levels of the frontier, almost all active rms
have high productivity.
Advancing technology does not lift all boats here. By assumption, the most able agents
20benet most from advances in the technological frontier, as they can deal more easily with the
increased complexity and use a larger fraction of the new technologies. Low-ability entrepreneurs
benet less. In fact, increasing wages due to higher productivity at top rms (wage earners
always gain from technological improvements) mean that the least productive rms' prots fall
as technology improves. As a consequence, marginal low-productivity entrepreneurs convert to
become wage earners, and eventually also do better, though not necessarily immediately. The
lowest-ability agents (a = 0) always lose. Technology improvements thus have a negative eect
on low-productivity rms that operates through wage increases.
Figure 5(a) depicts the consequences of this development: the entrepreneurship rate (solid)
falls as technology improves. While high-productivity rms replace the exiting low-productivity
ones, they operate at a larger scale, so their number is smaller. Similarly, the shares of necessity
entrepreneurs (dened as a < aL, dashed line) and employment in their rms (dash-dot line,
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(b) Average rm size and rm size dispersion
Figure 5: Model \time series"
This development in the model parallels the evidence from Section 2, which reported en-
trepreneurship rates and rates of necessity entrepreneurship that fall in income across countries
and in U.S. history. The model also replicates observed patterns in average rm size (solid
line in Figure 5(b)). If some agents are better placed than others to benet from technological
advances, they drive others out of the market. As a consequence, marginal small rms exit, av-
erage rm size grows (solid line), and fewer, more productive rms remain. Only a few necessity
21entrepreneurs remain active.
At the same time, rm size dispersion increases. (The gure shows the standard deviation
of employment, dashed line.) This has two sources. Firstly, for any xed thresholds aL and
aH, increases in  M imply increasing dispersion in productivity and therefore in employment.
On top of that, entry of very productive rms increases dispersion { as long there are small
rms around. As their proportion falls with development, this driver weakens, explaining the
concavity of the line in the gure.22
Of course, there currently still are small rms in rich countries like the U.S.. Possible reasons
for this are that empirically,  M only takes on an intermediate value, that other factors such as
tastes also matter, implying that some small rms remain active despite their low productivity
(the quantitative exercise in the next section allows for this), or that in some industries or
markets returns to scale decrease very quickly, implying a less convex (in a and  M) prot
function and longer activity of low-productivity rms.
Summarizing the model \time series", the model thus is consistent with the facts reported
in Section 2 that the entrepreneurship rate and the share of necessity entrepreneurs fall with
per capita income and that average rm size and rm size dispersion increase with per capita
income.
5 Quantitative exercise: occupational choice and entrepreneur-
ship across countries
How well do the historical experience of one country and cross-country patterns accord? This
is a test of how relevant the mechanisms in the model are relative to other factors aecting
entrepreneurship and the rm size distribution.
To explore this, I calibrate the model to the U.S. experience and then evaluate how well it
ts across a broad set of countries; in particular, how well it mimics the empirical relationships
shown in Section 2.
22How does this t with Hsieh and Klenow's (2009) nding of larger TFP dispersion in China than in the U.S.
(keeping in mind the measurement issues discussed in footnote 13)? The long left tail of the Chinese productivity
distribution visible in their Figure I suggests a large distortion of the entry and exit margin when seen through the
lens of standard heterogeneous rm models (Hopenhayn (1992); see also Samaniego (2006), Barseghyan (2008),
Poschke (forthcoming) and Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2010)). Given that their high size cuto probably
excludes from their data almost all the rather small rms run by necessity entrepreneurs, this corresponds to a
downward distortion of aH in the present context. If this distortion is large in a poor country, the model can
generate higher productivity dispersion of rms with a > aH in the poorer country. Dispersion computed using
rms of all sizes will however still be larger in the richer country, as it is in the GEM data.
225.1 Generalized model
For the quantitative exercise, it is useful to generalize the very stylized model from Section 3
slightly. I introduce three modications: production of intermediates with capital and labor,
heterogeneity in taste for entrepreneurship, and a more general specication of M(a).
Capital. In the simple model in Section 3, the dierentiated activities used for producing nal













i.e., production of intermediates with capital and labor. This allows setting  and  to match
income shares in the data. Firms' optimization is as in Section 3, taking the wage rate w and
the rental rate of capital r as given. Households, who own the capital stock and rent it to rms,
now face a capital accumulation decision. Their Euler equation, evaluated at the steady state
of the economy they live in (thus, given its  M), prescribes equating the rental rate of capital
net of depreciation to the rate of time preference. Assuming a common rate of time preference
 and a common depreciation rate , this implies r = +. The rm's optimality condition for
capital then pins down the aggregate capital stock.
Taste heterogeneity. In the model of Section 3, only agents with a < aL or a > aH become
entrepreneurs. Given the one-to-one mapping between a and M, this implies a bimodal rm size
distribution with only low- and high-productivity rms, but no rms with intermediate produc-
tivity. This is clearly counterfactual. Incorporating heterogeneity in tastes for entrepreneurship
into the model allows to \ll in" the hole in the middle of the rm size distribution, while
also adding realism. Indeed, most empirical studies of entrepreneurship point to some role for
heterogeneity in tastes or risk aversion for entrepreneurship (see e.g. Hamilton 2000).
Thus, suppose that agents dier in their taste for entrepreneurship . Dene this such
that individuals choose entrepreneurship if (a) > w  a.  > 1 then implies \enjoyment"
of entrepreneurship. If agents enjoy entrepreneurship, they will choose it even if (a) < w 
a. Whether on average agents enjoy entrepreneurship is an empirical question; therefore the
distribution of  has to be calibrated, and the mean could be dierent from 1. A mean below 1
indicates that on average, individuals do not enjoy entrepreneurship.
23With this additional dimension of heterogeneity, there are entrepreneurs of all levels of ability,
and the productivity distribution can be unimodal if the ability distribution is so. However, in-
dividuals of high or low ability are still more likely to become entrepreneurs. Changes in  M shift
the relationship of (a) and wa and therefore the taste threshold for entering entrepreneurship,
resulting in an evolution of the proportion of agents with a given a who are entrepreneurs.23
Heterogeneity in risk aversion combined with a simple extension of the model would yield
similar results. Suppose that wage income is certain and equals wa every period. Business
income is a function of the entrepreneur's ability and of an iid shock every period. (This
reects the higher variance of income from entrepreneurship; uctuating wages could easily be
accommodated, too.) Dene the shock such that prots are given by st(a);lnst  N(0;2
). Let
the period utility function be u(c) = c1 =(1   ), where the coecient of relative risk aversion
 can vary across people. Then period utility from working is (wa)1 =(1   ), and expected
period utility from entrepreneurship is E(st(a))1 =(1 ) = (a)1  exp((1 )22
=2)=(1 ).
Entrepreneurship thus is preferred if (e2
=2)1 (a) > wa. The term (e2
=2)1  here plays the
same role as the taste parameter  above: Higher risk aversion  or variance of prots 2
 make
entrepreneurship less attractive. The parametrization of heterogeneity in  in the next section
can thus alternatively be interpreted as describing variation in risk aversion. Because the setting
with risk aversion contains more free parameters and also raises issues of the dynamic behavior
of prots, I will pursue the taste interpretation in the remainder of the paper.
The technological frontier and complexity. How much additional complexity do advances
in the technological frontier comport? The simple specication of M(a) chosen in Section 3
restricted this relationship. But it is of course an empirical issue. Therefore, in this section, let
a rm's technology be given by
M(a;  M) =  M
a 
 ; (13)
23With heterogeneity in a only, it is reasonable to dene necessity entrepreneurs as those with a < aL, as in
Section 4.2. With two dimensions of heterogeneity, there can be entrepreneurs of all levels of a, so a dierent
denition is needed. I base this on characteristics of necessity entrepreneurs in the data and on the wording of the
survey question. First of all, in the GEM data, no owner of a large rm declares being a necessity entrepreneur.
I therefore never consider entrepreneurs running a rm with more than 5 times average employment as necessity
entrepreneurs. Secondly, the survey question suggests that necessity entrepreneurs choose this occupation because
it yields more income than the alternatives and not out of enjoyment. I thus impose  > wa as a second criterion;
excluding entrepreneurs who chose their occupation because of high .
24implying that its position relative to the frontier is
m(a;  M) =
M(a;  M)




The lower , the faster low-ability entrepreneurs fall behind the technological frontier as it
advances. Note that this relationship contains two parameters:  and  M, which is an important
parameter in its own right. They enter equation (13) suciently dierently that both can be
calibrated, using information from the U.S. time series.
5.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to U.S. data. Some parameters can be set using standard numbers from
the literature, while the remaining ones are calibrated to match a set of moments describing the
U.S. economy. Note in particular that  M has important eects on endogenous variables and can
therefore be calibrated using U.S. data.
The share parameters  and  are set to generate a prot share of income of 10% and a
labor share of two thirds. This implies a  of 0.9 and an  of 0.74. The elasticity of substitution
among intermediate inputs is set to 4, which is about the 75th percentile of the distribution of
 across 4-digit industries estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006).24 Setting the rate of time
preference to 4% and the depreciation rate to 10% per annum implies a rental rate of capital of
14%.
For the remaining parameters, rst suppose that the ability and taste distributions are log-
normal. A lognormal ability distribution implies that the wage distribution would be lognormal
if everyone was an employee. With taste heterogeneity, entrepreneurs will come from across the
ability distribution, and the wage distribution will be close to lognormal. For tastes, a lognormal
distribution also seems natural, as they aect payos multiplicatively. Letting ln a  N(a;a)
and ln  N(;), the remaining moments to be calibrated are a;a;;; and  M.
Data and model moments are shown in Table 1. U.S. data is for the year 2000, or close
years where that year is not available. To pin down the parameters, information about the
rm size distribution, about the distribution of wages and about the link between the two is
needed. Targets are chosen accordingly:25 Average employment (from the Census Statistics
of U.S. Businesses (SUSB)) and the rate of necessity entrepreneurship (from the GEM) are
24Results are robust to setting  substantially higher, to 6. This is although the sensitivity of prots with
respect to  M declines with  (see e.g. equation (4)).
25In fact, the six parameters have to be calibrated jointly. While the following discussion stresses the main
informational contribution of individual targets, parameters and target choices actually interact.
25informative about a and . Wage inequality, measured as the ratio between the 90th and the
10th percentile of the wage distribution, is taken from Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008, Figure
2.A) and helps to pin down a. Changes in  aect occupational choice and thereby both
the wage and the distribution of prots. A statistic that links the two is the fraction of rms
with prots smaller than the average wage, taken from Hamilton (2000, Figure 1 and Table
3). As seen in the previous section, the level of  M also aects the dispersion of the rm size
distribution. To capture this, I target the interquartile range standardized by mean rm size
(Census SUSB). This is a measure of dispersion that is robust to outliers, something especially
important with a distribution that is as skewed as the rm size distribution.26
Finally, to separate  and  M, information on changes over time is needed. It would be most
straightforward to use e.g. average rm size in 1900 in addition to average rm size in 2000, but
there is no single series that encompasses both dates. An alternative is to use the elasticity of
average rm size with respect to output per worker. This can be computed using any of the
four average rm size series plotted in Figure 2(a). They imply elasticities between 0.12 and
0.57. While the Dun & Bradstreet series is longest (1890-1983), the gure suggests that it may
overstate the increase in average rm size in the post-war period. To be conservative, I therefore
target an elasticity of 0.34, which is in the middle of the range in the data. Moreover, this value
is close to the ones implied by the recent SUSB series (1988-2006) and by the BEA Survey of
Current Business series when omitting the Great Depression years.
26Many thanks to Lori Bowan at the Census Bureau for providing a table with 1997 rm counts in detailed size
categories.
26Table 1: Calibration: Data and model moments
model data
average employment  n (2000) 19.8 20
rm size iqr/ n 0.29 0.30
fraction rms with  <  w 0.63 0.67
share necessity entrepreneurs 0.13 0.13
ln 90/10 wage ratio 1.68 1.66
"( n;Y ) 0.34 0.34
Sources for data moments: average rm size and interquartile range (iqr) from Census Statistics of U.S. Businesses
(SUSB) tabulations; fraction rms with  <  w from Hamilton (2000); share of necessity entrepreneurship from
GEM, see Section 2.1; wage ratio from Autor et al. (2008, Figure 2A); elasticity of average employment with
respect to output per worker uses average rm size data plotted in Figure 2(a) combined with data on non-farm
employment from the BLS and from Weir (1992, Table D3), reprinted in Carter et al. (2006), and data on non-farm
output from the BEA (http://www.bea.gov/bea, Table 1.3.6) and from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975,
Series F128).
Values of the calibrated parameters are reported in Table 2. On average, individuals do
not like entrepreneurship (the implied average  in the population is clearly below 1), and thus
require a premium before they take it up. There is substantial variation, however. Also note
that the  M resulting from the calibration describes the U.S. level of technology in 2000. To
evaluate cross-country patterns, it will be necessary to set other countries'  M relative to the
U.S. level such that the output ratios match the data. The model-generated \time series" of
average employment in the U.S. is plotted against non-farm output per worker in Figure 6. As
the calibration ts the observed elasticity of 0.34 well, the series of average employment also ts
well.
Table 2: Calibrated parameter values
from external sources:
    
0.9 0.74 4 0.04 0.1
from tting U.S. target moments:
a a     M
-0.5792 0.66528 -4.3191 2.4848 13.5080 783.9069
An interesting dimension that has not been targeted in the calibration is the evolution of















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6: Average rm employment over U.S. history, data and model
as entrepreneurs' incomes lie at the extremes of the income distribution. Figure 7 reports the
income shares of the top 10% and 1% in the U.S. income distribution for the data (from Piketty
and Saez 2006, for 1950-2002) and for the model, plotted against U.S. GDP per capita relative
to its level in 2002. It is not surprising that inequality in the model does not reach its level in
the data, as the model has no mechanism generating a fat right tail of the income distribution.
What is remarkable, however, is that the trend in the model essentially replicates the trend in
the data. For instance, from the mid-1960s to 2002, the income share of the top 1% increased
by 6.6 percentage points. The model captures three quarters of this increase. It only misses the
jump in U.S. income inequality that is known to have occurred in the 1980s (at about 75% of
2002 GDP per capita).
5.3 Results
The model ts the U.S. experience quite well. To evaluate the t with other countries, each
country is assigned the  M that replicates the output per capita ratio to the U.S. observed
in the data. This  M is then taken to be the country's state of technology. Figure 8 plots the
entrepreneurship rate, average rm size, rm size dispersion and share of necessity entrepreneurs
generated by the model for these levels of  M against the data. The straight line in each graph















































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Income concentration at the top, U.S., 1950-2002, model and data
Source: Piketty and Saez (2006).
the model.
Given that it was calibrated to the U.S., the model ts the cross-country experience rather
well. Of course, as shown in Section 4, it predicts that the entrepreneurship rate and necessity
entrepreneurship fall with per capita income, while average rm size and the dispersion of rm
size increase with it.
Strikingly for such a stylized model, however, the quantitative performance is quite good.
The predicted change in the entrepreneurship rate with per capita income has exactly the right
slope. The level is somewhat o just because the calibration forces it to pass through the U.S.
data point. The prediction for average employment also ts well.
The model overpredicts the sensitivity of rm size dispersion and the share of necessity
entrepreneurship with respect to per capita income. The model predictions are a bit too extreme
in these two dimensions, with too many necessity entrepreneurs in very poor countries. Their
dominance and the fact that skill dierences do not aect optimal rm size much for low levels of
technology imply too little rm size dispersion at this income level. Note however that in some
poor countries, measured rm size dispersion may be inated by government policy promoting
certain rms. The model of course cannot pick this up. Indeed, the model predictions miss


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) Fraction necessity entrepreneurs
Figure 8: Entrepreneurship and the rm size distribution versus output per capita (relative to
the U.S. levels): model (green curved line) and data (red line: OLS t)
Notes: Data sources as in Figure 1.
the transition economies of Russia and Latvia. In contrast, the prediction ts quite well with
the experience of many other poor countries.27
27Can the model explain the positive relationship between the density of registered businesses and income
observed in e.g. the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey data? Suppose that businesses above a certain
size threshold nd it optimal to register. This would be observed if the benets of doing so increase more quickly
with size than registration costs. (Indeed, empirical work long identied the informal sector with small rms with
for instance less than 20 workers; see e.g. Rauch (1991).) Although the eect of  M on aL and aH implies that the
proportion of large rms increases with income in the model, the fraction of the population running a rm above
a certain size does not necessarily do so because of the accompanying fall in the entrepreneurship rate. The net
eect of the two depends on the level of  M and on the size threshold; e.g. in the model calibration, the population
fraction running rms with more than 50 workers increases up to about the U.S. level of  M and then declines.
The model can of course generate the relationship between business registration and income if registration costs
are higher in poor countries, as documented by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002).
306 Conclusion
Despite the existence of a large literature on the eects of technological change, its eects
on entrepreneurial entry and its aggregate implications have not received much attention. To
address this gap, this paper proposed a very simple model based on skill-biased change in
entrepreneurial technology, or the idea that the benets from technological progress may be
larger for more skilled entrepreneurs. The model ts well with U.S. historical evidence and,
when calibrated to the U.S., even explains cross-country variation in a broad dataset well.
This is despite the simplicity of the model, with technology as the only driver of cross-country
dierences and abstracting from other factors such as risk or nancial constraints. Linking
these to the mechanism explored here may make for exciting future work. Skill-biased change
in entrepreneurial technology may thus constitute an important determinant of entrepreneurial
choice and the rm size distribution, helping to explain dierences both over time and across
countries.
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